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GROWTH MANAGEMENT UPDATE:
AN ASSESSMENT AND STATUS REPORT
DAVID J. BROWER* and JAMES H. PANNABECKER**

INTRODUCTION

Growth management may be defined as a conscious governmental
effort to influence the rate, amount, type, location, and/or quality of

future development within the territorial jurisdiction of a municipality.'

Many communities have engaged in some variety of growth

management since the early 1900's2 and Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,' but the concept has undergone major changes and has
gained growing support during the past decade.4 State courts have
been developing new tests for evaluating the ways localities use their

powers to guide growth,'

and Congress6 and state legislatures 7 are

*David J. Brower, Associate Director, Center for Urban and Regional Studies, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
**James H. Pannabecker, M.R.P., J.D. 1978, University of North Carolina, Attorney, A.
S. Pratt & Sons, Inc., Washington, D.C.
1. See D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. McBENNETT, & B. VESTAL, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES].
2. The early efforts made exclusive use of Euclidean zoning techniques, which divided a
jurisdiction into districts or zones, with different regulations for each district.
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In this case the Supreme Court upheld zoning as a valid exercise
of the police power. Moreover, it held that such restrictions can be invalidated only if they
clearly do not promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.
4. A catalog of growth management tools and techniques is provided in R. SCOTT, D.
BROWER & D. MINER, II MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH (1975). Most
of today's growth control systems rely heavily on variations of traditional zoning techniques, but communities are often innovative in the way they combine tools and adapt them
to achieve local goals. See generally D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, D. HERR, & B.
VESTAL, RESPONSIBLE GROWTH MANAGEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (1977).
See also D. BROWER & C. CARRAWAY, TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF GROWTH
MANAGEMENT (1978).
5. See text accompanying notes 22-101, infra.
6. In 1964 only six federal programs imposed areawide planning requirements. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGIONAL DECISION
MAKING: NEW STRATEGIES FOR SUBSTATE DISTRICTS 169 (1973). By 1976 this
number had increased to 32. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGIONALISM REVISITED: RECENT AREAWIDE AND LOCAL RESPONSES
11-19 (1977). For examples of these programs, see HUD's Section 701 planning program,
40 U.S.C. §461 (Supp. V 1975) and 24 C.F.R. §600 (1977); EPA's Section 208 Water
Quality Management Planning Program, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V 1975) and 40 C.F.R.
§131 (1976).
7. See notes 102-23, infra, and accompanying text.
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now frequently mandating that comprehensive plans be adopted and
followed at local and regional levels.
A variety of challenges can be raised by persons affected by
growth management efforts. The classic challenge argues that a
growth management policy violates the "taking" clause of the Fifth
Amendment or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, or similar clauses of state constitutions.8 A second constitutional challenge is based on federal and
state equal protection clauses and may be brought by a landowner or
other affected party who believes he has been treated more harshly
than others similarly situated. 9
This article focuses upon two additional, but closely related, challenges. The first-the regional general welfare challenge-is based
upon the due process clause found in most state constitutions, and
its requirement that local regulatory action further health, safety,
morals, and general welfare.'0 The second is grounded on a claim
that a particular zoning requirement does not faithfully implement
the community's adopted master or comprehensive plan'' and is
therefore invalid.
8. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For a readable
discussion of due process and taking challenges see CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra note
1, chs. 3 & 4. And see Wengert, Due Process, Equal Protection and Land Use Planningand
Regulation, 19 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1978).
9. See Constitutional Issues, supra note 1, ch. 6; Wengert, supra note 8, at 1. Equal
protection challenges may also be brought against land use schemes that are alleged to be
exclusionary (e.g., ordinances that prohibit the construction of low-cost housing). Plaintiffs
will generally have to rely on state law in challenging such policies because the Federal
courts not only exercise a traditional restraint in entertaining such actions, but require proof
of discriminatory intent or purpose to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The
requisite intent was found in United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). Discriminatory intent was found lacking in
Mahaley v. Cuyohoga Metropolitan Housing Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Ci. 1974); Acevedo
v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974); Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F. Supp. 432 (D.
Vt. 1973). Nevertheless, exclusionary zoning policies may violate Federal statutes, e.g., the
Fair Housing Act. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, on
remand, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1977).
10. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
11. See text accompanying notes 62-101, infra.
Another constitutional challenge has been raised. Plaintiffs have argued that growth
management policies illegally restrict the constitutional right to travel. The specific source
of this right is unclear. Compare Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) and Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871) (Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST.
Art. IV, § 2); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Privileges and Immunities Clause,
U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 284 (1849) and Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (the Commerce Clause); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964) (Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Court applied Equal Protection analysis); United States v.
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It is ordinarily difficult to prevail using any of these challenges,
because judicial review of local legislative action has been traditionally governed by a standard formulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid." 2 This standard, which is used

by a majority of the states, begins with a presumption that all local
legislative acts are valid, and thus the municipality need not defend
any legislative act until the challenger at least arguably demonstrates
that the act is invalid. 1 3 Rebuttal of this "presumption of validity,"
as it is often called, is particularly burdensome for those challenging
growth management systems because land use regulations are usually
considered legislative in character and are thus upheld unless shown
to be clearly arbitrary or unreasonable." 4

If the challenger is able to convince the court that reasonable
persons could find the regulation arbitrary or unreasonable, the presumption of validity is overcome and the court then proceeds to
examine the ordinance itself. The municipality, however, in order to
prevail needs only to present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that
the legislators, in adopting the act, had a rational basis for their
action.' I A local government can satisfy this by showing: (1) that
the regulation was adopted in pursuit of a legitimate objective of the
police power; (2) that the regulation is reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective; and (3) that the regulation is not unduly
oppressive. ' 6
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (U.S. CONST. generally). In Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City
of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), a United States District Court viewed
Petaluma's growth control measures as penalties on the exercise of the right to travel and
therefore employed the compelling interest standard of review to invalidate them. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise
the right to travel claim. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
12. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13. See 272 U.S. at 388.
14. Id. at 387. The showing that must be made by the challenger varies from one
jurisdiction to another. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 68-101, infra.
Several courts do not treat all land use regulations identically; they draw a distinction
between legislative and quasi-judicial actions. See text accompanying notes 77-98, infra. The
distinction is generally based on the parties affected by a regulation. If a large group of
landowners is affected and the action can be viewed as expressive of general policy, a
regulation is legislative. If, on the other hand, a zoning action focuses on a specific property,
it is likely to be characterized as quasi-judicial. See, e.g., Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189
Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 89 Nev.
533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973); Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); R.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 123-25 (4th ed. 1972). When a court draws this
distinction, quasi-judicial actions must be supported by reasoned decisionmaking and affected parties must be granted certain due process protections; i.e., the presumption of
validity is no longer applicable. See notes 77-98, infra, and accompanying text.
15. See 272 U.S. at 389-90.
16. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
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Recent decisions have weakened the traditional presumption of
validity 1 7 and have modified accepted notions of what are legitimate
objectives of the police power.' 8 Although these decisions have not
been accepted by a majority of state courts, they are very important
because they have been decided by courts that have traditionally
been in the forefront in the evolution of planning law." 9 Moreover,
the cases make sense and are responsive to a rich literature espousing
the principle that localities cannot plan in a vacuum. 2 0
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "REGIONAL GENERAL WELFARE"
CHALLENGE
A series of cases has adopted an enlarged definition of the "general
welfare" concept. Courts traditionally have held that due process
requires a local government to exercise its regulatory powers in furtherance of the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of its own
community. 2 1 Recent attempts by localities to influence the rate,
location, and type of growth, however, have demonstrated the
dangers inherent in a self-centered interpretation of general welfare.
For example, local growth controls often divert potential residents to
second or third choice living environments, or force localities in the
region to absorb a disproportionate share of the public service and
facility costs incurred in accommodating new residents. A number of
recent decisions recognize the shortcomings of the traditional definition of general welfare and impose a responsibility on local governments to consider the regional impacts of local decisions.
"Open Doors"
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote the first page of the
regional general welfare chapter in the history of growth manage17. See notes 77-98, infra, and accompanying text.
18. See text accompanying notes 22-58, infra.
19. See N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW 81, 91-92 (1974); Scott, An
ImpressionisticHypothesis: Twenty Land Use Hypotheses for the Late 1970s, Envt'l Com.
12(1977).
20. E.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
REGIONALISM REVISITED: RECENT AREAWIDE AND LOCAL RESPONSES 35
(1977); CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 27 (review draft 1977); MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF
STATE PLANNING, CITIES AND TOWN CENTERS: A PROGRAM FOR GROWTH 81
(1977); B. MacKAYE, THE NEW EXPLORATION (1928); ALl, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE Art. 7 (1976).
See Intergovernmental Coordination Act of 1977: S. 892, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
(sponsored by Sen. Magnuson and others); H.R. 4406, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
(sponsored by Rep. Ashley and others).
21. E.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133,136-37 (1894).
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ment litigation. In National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn,2 2 the
court invalidated a zoning ordinance that established a four-acre
minimum lot size. Although the court did not expressly mention
regional welfare, it articulated a concern for the regional implications
of self-centered local regulation:
It is not difficult to envision the tremendous hardship, as well as
the chaotic conditions, which would result if all the townships in
this area decided to deny to a growing population sites for residential development within the means of at least a significant segment of the people. 2 3
The court reiterated this concern in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders,
Inc.,2 a case that struck down ordinances requiring lot sizes of at
least two and three acres, and held that a locality may not disregard
the interests of the larger area of which it is a part.
In 1971, a Michigan appellate court expressed a similar concern
when it expanded the state's "preferred use" doctrine, a doctrine
that reversed the presumption of validity when applied to an ordinance that excludes certain preferred land uses.2 s According to the
expanded doctrine, a land use was a preferred use if it substantially
advanced the regional public interest. However, this definition was
subsequently overruled and replaced by2 6a test of whether the use was
totally excluded from the community.
2
The case of Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo 7
signaled New York State's appearance on the regional welfare scene.
In the late 1960's, the Town of Ramapo adopted a comprehensive
plan, a capital improvements program and a zoning ordinance to
implement the plan. The ordinance made the existence of adequate
public facilities a prerequisite to the issuance of a development
permit. The program was challenged on the ground that it enhanced
local values to the detriment of surrounding communities. New
York's highest court upheld the plan, finding that it showed sufficient concern for regional growth pressures:
[Ramapo's regulations] seek, not to freeze population at present
levels but to maximize growth by the efficient use of land, and in so
22. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
23. Id. at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610.
24. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). The Court continued this line of thought in
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). But see notes 48-51, infra and
accompanying text.
25. Green v. Township of Lima, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1972);
Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1971).
26. Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
27. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409

U.S. 1003 (1972).
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doing testify to this community's continuing role in population
assimilation...
We only require that communities
confront the challenge of
28
population growth with open doors.

FairShare: The Formulaic Approach
The "open doors" approach did not satisfy the New Jersey
Supreme Court, however. In Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel,2 9 the court held that local regulatory
actions must meet the need for adequate housing of all income

groups residing within the region:
[E] very [developing] municipality 3 0 must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate
variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it
cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned
for low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must
affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent of the
municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need

therefor.3 1

The newly created presumption could only be overcome by demonstrating particular circumstances which dictate
to the contrary; for
3
example, severe environmental constraints. 2
The Court's remedy was cautious and conservative, based upon a
conviction that the community "should first have full opportunity to
itself act without judicial supervision. ' 3 3 Accordingly, the Township
was given ninety days in which to adopt appropriate zoning amendments and take any necessary additional action. The Court expected
28. 30 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53.
29. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). The
Mount Laurel case has been a frequent subject of commentary. See, e.g., Ackerman, The
Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1;
Symposium, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST No. 6 (1975); Note, Exclusionary
Zoning: The View from Mount Laurel, 40 ALBANY L. REV. 646 (1976); Williams &
Doughty, Studies in Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre, and Berman, 29 RUTGERS
L. REV. 73 (1975).
30. The "developing" municipality exception to Mount Laurel has been explored in later
New Jersey cases. E.g., Nigito v. Borough of Closter, 142 N.J. Super. 1,359 A.2d 521 (Supr.
Ct. App. Div. 1976), pet. for certification denied, 74 N.J. 265, 377 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1977);
Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of the Township of Washington, Bergen County, 131
N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1974), modified, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d6
(1977); Segal Constr. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 134 N.J. Super. 421, 341 A.2d 667
(1975) (Super. Ct. App. Div.), petition for certification denied, 68 N.J. 496, 348 A.2d 536
(1975).
31. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 186-87, 336 A.2d at 731.
33. Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
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Mount Laurel, in exercising these responsibilities, to derive a reasonable fair share housing figure from information "concerning the
housing needs of persons of low and moderate income now or formerly residing in the township in substandard dwellings and those
presently employed or reasonably expected to be employed
therein.

. ."I

I

FairShare: Least-Cost Housing
A 1977 decision, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 3" both modified and expanded the Mount Laurel opinion. Because successive New Jersey laws required local communities to provide additional and increasingly expensive public services, Madison
Township found itself in need of increased real estate tax revenues. It
also discovered that multifamily units appeared to be yielding less
than their pro rata share of real estate taxes. Thus, in 1970 Madison
adopted a new ordinance, rezoning most of its vacant land for one or
two-acre single family dwellings. As a result of pressure from developers, a 1973 amendment reduced these minimum lot sizes, but
even so, only 2.37 percent of the Township's developable land remained zoned for multifamily housing.
Several low-income nonresidents and a group of large scale developers who had planned to build a four hundred-acre project of
which twenty percent of the housing units were to be for low income
families, challenges the ordinance. A New Jersey superior court
invalidated the regulation because it failed to promote the general
welfare of the region. 3 6 The court held that the Township's obligation "to provide its fair share of the housing needs of its region
[was] not met unless its zoning ordinance approximate[d] in
additional housing unit capacity the same proportion of low-income
housing as its present low-income population. .

.. "'

The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's
basic premises and found that the zoning ordinance did not make
adequate provision for the Township's fair share of the regional need
for low and moderate income housing, a responsibility inherent in
34. Id. at 190, 336 A.2d at 733. Fair share housing formulae have been used elsewhere to
determine housing requirements. E.g., METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF
GOVERNMENTS, THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA'S AREAWIDE HOUSING OPPORTUNITY PLAN (1976); D. LISTOKIN, FAIR SHARE HOUSING ALLOCATION (1976).
35. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
36. 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1971), on rem'd, 128 N.J.
Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1974).
37. 128 N.J. Super. at 447, 320 A.2d at 227.
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the Township's obligation to zone for the general welfare. The Court,
however, introduced a new concept: "least-cost housing." 3 8 Giving
the township ninety days to submit a revised zoning ordinance, the
Court warned that the revisions must: (1) designate substantial areas
for small lot single family housing; (2) increase the amount of land
available for dwellings on moderately sized lots; (3) enlarge existing
or create other multifamily zones; (4) modify the PUD and multifamily zoning restrictions that discourage developers from building
dwellings with more than two bedrooms; and (5) take any other
steps necessary to eliminate undue cost-generating regulations in the
lower-income housing zones.' I Satisfaction of these criteria was expected to enable the construction of "least-cost housing," which
might not provide newly constructed housing for low-income persons
but would eventually augment the supply of cheaper housing
through the "trickle down" effect. 4 0
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court's
formulaic approach to the provision of Madison's fair share of
regional housing:
We are convinced... that attention by those concerned, whether

courts or local governing bodies, to the substance of a zoning ordinance under challenge and to bona fide efforts toward the elimination or minimization of undue cost-generating requirements in
respect of reasonable areas of a developing municipality represents
the best promise for adequate productiveness without resort to
formulaic estimates of specific unit "fair shares" of lower cost housing by any of the complex and controversial allocation "models"
now coming into vogue. 4 '
The Court refused to require affirmative action beyond that of eliminating the exclusionary zoning, but it reiterated sentiment it had
expressed in Mount Laurel: that communities do, under certain circumstances, have a modal obligation to sponsor public housing
projects.
FairShare. Affirmative Remedy
The New York Court of Appeals, in Berenson v. Town of New
Castle,4 2 followed the lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court, hold38. 72 N.J. at 510-14, 547, 553, 371 A.2d at 1206-08, 1225, 1228.
39. Id. at 553, 371 A.2d at 1228.
40. Id. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207.
41. Id. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200 (footnote omitted).
42. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S. 2d 672 (1975). In response to this case,
two New York Assemblymen have introduced legislation to combat exclusionary zoning.
News, 29 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST 3 (Nov. 8,1977).
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ing that localities must consider regional housing needs. Under New
York's formulation of a regional welfare standard, a municipality
may prohibit multifamily housing only if regional and local housing
needs are supplied by the community or by other accessible areas
within the region. 4"
On remand, the Westchester Supreme Court found that the New
Castle zoning failed to satisfy the test promulgated by the New York
Court of Appeals. 4 4 The Court then went on to fashion an innovative affirmative remedy, a step beyond that taken by the New Jersey
courts. First, the trial court granted site-specific relief, ordering New
Castle to rezone the plaintiffs' land for multifamily use "subject only
to such standards as are reasonably related to protecting the health
and safety of the community and the occupants of the plaintiffs'
development." 4 '
Second, the Court addressed the issue of more comprehensive
relief and devised a two stage remedy. During the first stage, the
presumption of validity ordinarily granted local government actions
was reversed: "a party desiring to construct [multifamily] housing
need only show that the proposed development will contribute to
meeting [the judicially established regional fair share] goals and that
the Town has frustrated that objective for less than compelling
reasons." 4 6 The second stage of the remedy was to begin after New
Castle had adopted a satisfactory plan and comprehensive zoning
ordinance. At that time the ordinary presumption was to be reinstated.4 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also accepted the regional
fair share housing approach and countenanced affirmative remedial
action. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Upper
Providence4 8 reviewed a challenge to an ordinance that zoned only
1.14 per cent of Upper Providence Township's total acreage for
multifamily housing. In analyzing the effect of the ordinance to
determine whether it satisfied the fair share standard, the Court
looked at the percentage of land available for multifamily housing,
current local and regional growth pressures, and the amount of de43. The court espoused a two-part test: (1) whether the town has adopted a properly
balanced and well ordered plan for its community, and (2) whether, in enacting an ordinance, consideration has been given to regional needs and requirements. 38 N.Y.2d at 110,
341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
44. 5 Housing Dev. Rep. 722 (Dec. 6, 1977).
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977). In delivering its opinion, the Court relied heavily
on its earlier holding in Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341
A.2d 466 (1975).
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velopable land in the community. The Court invalidated the ordinance after concluding that the Township was a "logical place for
development to take place" 4" and that the actual area in which
multifamily uses were allowed was too small. 0 Although stopping
short of the comprehensive remedy devised by the Berenson court,
Surrick also directed site-specific relief: it ordered that Plaintiffs
land be rezoned and that a building permit be issued, conditional
upon compliance with administrative requirements and reasonable
controls and regulations.' 1
The CaliforniaApproach
Between World War II and 1970, the City of Livermore in California experienced an eightfold increase in population. Because of
the resulting environmental problems and strain on public facilities,
the City passed an ordinance by initiative that prohibited further
residential growth until specified school, water, and sewer facility
standards had been satisfied. In Associated Home Builders of Greater
Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,12 a superior court granted an
injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the California Supreme Court remanded the case
because it found the record inadequate.5 I In remanding, it offered
guidance to the lower court:
[T] he land use restriction withstands constitutional attack if it is
fairly debatable that the restriction in fact bears a reasonable relation to the general welfare. For the guidance of the trial court we
point out that if a restriction significantly affects residents of surrounding communities, the constitutionality of the restriction must
be measured by its impact not only upon the welfare of the enacting
54
community, but upon the welfare of the surrounding region.
This standard is more deferential than the one employed by the
New Jersey courts, a fact recognized by the Court:
49. 476 Pa. at 851, 382 A.2d at 108. This phrase was drawn from the Court's earlier
decision in Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 398-99 (1970).
50. The Court looked at the percentage of land available for multifamily dwellings to
determine whether the zoning exclusion was "partial" or "total." If it were total, Appeal of
Girsh would clearly invalidate it. On the other hand, if it were partial, the question becomes
more difficult, Although Upper Providence did not totally exclude multifamily housing, it
nevertheless permitted such a small amount that it clearly failed to satisfy its fair share,
making its situation identical to that in Township of Willistown (in that case the township
had permitted apartments in only 80 of 11,589 acres). 476 Pa. at 382 A.2d at 111-12.
51. Id. at 382 A.2d at 112. Unlike the New Jersey court, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not rejected the Mount Laurel formulaic approach. Id. at 382 A.2d at 109.
52. 41 Cal. App. 3d 677 116 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1974).
53. 18 Cal.3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
54. Id. at 601, 557 P.2d at 483, 135 Cal Rptr. at 51.
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Not only do [the New Jersey and Pennsylvania] decisions rest, for
the most part, upon principles of state law inapplicable in California,
but, unlike the present case, all involve ordinances which impede the
ability of low and moderate income persons to immigrate to a com55
munity but permit largely unimpeded entry by wealthier persons.

In summary, although the California Supreme Court adopted a
regional general welfare standard, it approved a standard of review
that was midway between the traditional standard of legislative
deference and that of strict judicial scrutiny as established by Mount
Laurel and its progeny.' 6
Regional General Welfare in Perspective
As we have demonstrated, a series of cases decided within the past
decade have redefined the general welfare limitation on local exercise
of the police power. The Pennsylvania courts were the first to
measure growth management policies against a regional general welfare standard recognizing the chaos that might result if localities were
permitted to ignore the regional impact of locally adopted exclusionary land use policies. New York and Michigan lower courts
joined Pennsylvania in adopting an "open doors" requirement for-

bidding the total exclusion of certain residential uses. This approach,
however, proved to be too conservative for the New Jersey Supreme
Court. Taking a "broadened impact" approach, the New Jersey court
imposed upon localities an affirmative responsibility to provide all
income groups with an opportunity to obtain housing within their
means. California recently joined the regional general welfare states,
while Pennsylvania and New York have refined their earlier recognition of the regional welfare standard.
Although a majority of states have not yet accepted a regional
general welfare standard, they may do so in the future. California,
New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey are generally acknowledged
to be harbingers of land use law development, therefore other states
may well follow their lead.' 7 Local governments in states that have
not adopted a regional general welfare standard should nevertheless
keep three things in mind. First, if a state court does eventually
adopt the standard, all growth management systems (whether already
existing or adopted after the court decision) will be judged according
55. Id. at 606, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
56. E.g., in Surrick, the Pennsylvania Court agreed with appellees that a presumption of
validity attaches to all zoning ordinances. Where, however, the "facts show a dearth of land
zoned as available for multi-family dwellings," the presumption is rebutted. 476 Pa. 182
n. 13, 382 A.2d at 112 n. 13. Thus, the real difference among the three approaches is the
quantum of evidence necessary to rebut the ordinary presumption of validity.
57. See note 19, supra.
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to the same standard. Second, the state may enact land use legislas
tion that requires local planning to consider regional impacts. 8
Finally, it is simply more socially responsible to consider the regional
welfare in local planning than to focus exclusively on community
welfare, and it may be possible to simultaneously maximize both
local and regional welfare. Thus, it may be wise for local governments to consider regional needs from the outset.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLANNING AND ZONING:
INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING
JudicialApproaches
In another group of cases the courts have emphasized the role of
the comprehensive plan in local land use regulation. The Oregon
courts took the lead in this direction, viewing the separately prepared
and enacted plan as the controlling land use instrument for a locality.5s Although other courts have refused to go as far as Oregon,
they have begun to recognize a more important role for planning in
effective growth management. This recognition is manifested by
judicial willingness to cite the policies of adopted plans as the courts
wrestle with the presumption of validity traditionally accorded local
regulatory actions.6 This increased emphasis on land use planning
and locally adopted comprehensive plans is particularly appropriate
at a time when localities frequently employ flexible zoning techniques and, in so doing, reject the earlier conception of zoning ordinances and maps as projections of future land use patterns. The
zoning ordinance, at least in these states, can no longer be viewed as
a "plan." '6
This was not the situation in the 1920s when the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) 6 2 and the Standard City Planning
58. Cf Hawaii Rev. Stat. §225-21(c) (1976) ("All state agencies, and the respective
counties, shall comply with and implement the state plan..."); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§473.865(2) (West 1977) ("A [Twin Cities] local governmental unit shall not adopt any
official control or fiscal device which is in conflict with its comprehensive plan or which
permits activities in conflict with metropolitan system plans."); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§197.175(2)(b) (1977) ("Each city and county shall enact zoning, subdivision and other
ordinances or regulations to implement their comprehensive plans [which, in turn, must be
consistent with statewide planning goals]."); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §9-19-301 (1977) (Local
governments within each county are required to develop land use plans, which are later
collected by the county and submitted as part of the county plan for approval by the state).
59. See notes 77-94, infra, and accompanying text.
60. See notes 68-70, 99-101, infra, and accompanying text.
61. See Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation,
74 Mich. L. Rev. 900, 910 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mandelker].
62. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT
(rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in H. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
765-770 (4th ed. 1975).
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Enabling Act (SPEA), 6 the documents that spawned much of the
existing zoning and planning legislation, were promulgated. The
SZEA assumed that land uses would be assigned to mapped districts
before development occurred. It therefore seemed appropriate to
read the Act's requirement that "[zoning] regulations shall be made
in accordance with a comprehensive plan" 6 4 as requiring only an
examination of the comprehensiveness of the zoning ordinance itself
rather than a comparison of the ordinance with an independently
prepared and adopted master plan. 6 This interpretation was supported by the fact that the SPEA and its master plan provisions
appeared several years after the SZEA and by the failure of the SPEA
to give the master plan a solid and definitive role in the zoning
process. Early decisions accepted this construction of the model
acts6 6 and a majority of today's courts apparently still agree with
this "unitary" view.6
Nevertheless, a number of courts perceive a connection between
comprehensive planning and local land use legislation. One group of
cases has at least partially relied upon the policies of locally adopted
plans in rejecting claims by landowners that land use regulations were
6
arbitrarily and unconstitutionally applied to their properties. 8
Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo 69 is one of these
63. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT
(rev. ed. 1928), reprintedin E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 3-15 (1971).
64. SZEA §3.
65. See Mandelker, supra note 61, at 910.
66. See Sullivan & Kressel, Twenty Years After-Renewed Significance of the Comprehensive Plan Requirement, 9 Urb. L. Ann. 33 (1975); Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154 (1955).
67. E.g., Come v. Chancy, 289 Ala. 555, 269 So.2d 88 (1972); Weigel v. Planning &
Zoning Comm'n of the Town of Westport, 160 Conn. 239, 278 A.2d 766 (1971); Dawson
Enterprises v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977); Nottingham Village,
Inc. v. Baltimore County, 266 Md. 339, 292 A.2d 680 (1972); Sabo v. Township of Monroe,
394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975); Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154,
131 A.2d 1 (1957); Tulsa Rock Co. v. Board of County Comm'ns of Rodgers County, 531
P.2d 351 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment of Tredyffrim Township,
414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964); Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277 (R.I.
1976). Cf Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 111.App. 3d 230, 309
N.E.2d 763 (1974); Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970);
Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Nev. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686 (1977); Udell v. Haas, 21
N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968); Shelton v. City of Bellevue, 73
Wash. 2d 28, 435 P.2d 949 (1968). See Mandelker, supra note 61, at 904.
68. E.g., Montgomery County Council v. Leizman, 268 Md. 621, 303 A.2d 374 (1973);
Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700
(1969); Biske v. City of Troy, 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899 (1967), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969); Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965); Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972); (appeal dismissed 409
U.S. 1003 (1972)); State ex rel. Standard Mining & Dev. Corp. v. City of Auburn, 82 Wash.
2d 321, 510 P.2d 647 (1973). Cf Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211,164 A.2d
7(1960).
69. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
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decisions. In Golden, the court stated: "The restrictions conform to
the community's considered land use policies as expressed in its comprehensive plan and represent a bona fide effort to maximize population density consistent with orderly growth." 7 For this and other
reasons, the court found it impossible to conclude that the restrictions were unreasonable and arbitrary.
Making decisions such as Golden look like mere verbiage, the state
courts of Oregon have jumped far ahead of other jurisdictions and
have found a close nexus between local planning and zoning activities. Unlike most states, Oregon's zoning enabling legislation was
passed prior to the publication of the standard enabling acts, 7 ' and
it required that city zoning regulations be "in accordance with a
well-considered plan." 7 2 Counties were later given the power to zone
if they had a "development pattern," 7 the wording of which was
subsequently changed to "comprehensive plan." 7 4 In 1969, a new
bill was passed that mandated the preparation of local comprehensive
land use plans and zoning ordinances.' I
After years of little discussion of the comprehensive plan requirement, 7 6 the Oregon Supreme Court broke its silence in Fasano v.
Board of County Commissioners.7 7 Plaintiffs, a group of homeowners, challenged a zoning change that would have allowed mobile
homes in an area previously zoned for conventional single family
dwellings. The court characterized the zoning change as a quasijudicial rather than a legislative action 7 ' and consequently it did not
apply the traditional presumption of validity of local legislative
acts. 7 9 Because the state legislature "has conditioned the county's
power to zone upon the prerequisite that the zoning attempt to
further the general welfare of the community through consciousness,
in a prospective sense, of the [considerations entering into the
70. Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
71. Padrow, Sharpe, & Sullivan, The Renaissance of Comprehensive Planning: The
Oregon Case, 27 Land Use L. & Zoning Digest 7, 7 (No. 5, 1975).
72. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 227.240(1) (1973), repealed by Laws of 1975, ch. 767, § 10.
73. Law of April 19, 1947, ch. 537, [1947] Ore. L. 948.
74. Law of June 24, 1963, ch. 619, §3, [19631 Ore. L. 1297. The section now reads:
"Zoning [ordinances] shall be designed to implement the adopted county comprehensive
plan." Ore. Rev. Stat. §215.050 (1977).
75. Law of June 3, 1969, ch. 324, [19691 Ore. L. 578. This bill was replaced by S.B.
100. See notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
76. See Sullivan & Kressel, supra note 66, at 49.
77. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
78. Id. at 580-86, 507 P.2d at 26-29.
79. Id. at 578-79, 586, 507 P.2d at 27, 29. Under the deferential standard of review, a
legislative action is upheld unless shown to be arbitrary and capricious. Under the Fasano
standard for quasi-judicial actions, the persons seeking change (the county) shoulders the
initial burden. Id.
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formulation of a comprehensive plan]

,"8

0

the appropriate standard

places a heavy burden on the county board to show that zoning
changes were made in accordance with the comprehensive plan."
This burden could only be met by demonstrating that there is a
public need for the change, and that the proposed change will best
serve the public need. 8 2
The Court also rejected the traditional judicial view of planning
and zoning:
Although we are aware of the analytical distinction between zoning and planning, it is clear that under our statutes the plan adopted
by the planning commission and the zoning ordinances enacted by
the county governing body are closely related; both are intended to
be parts of a single integrated procedure for land use control. The

plan embodies policy determinations and guiding principles; the zoning ordinances provide the detailed means of giving effect to those
principles. 8 3
After Fasano was decided, Oregon adopted S.B. 100, the Oregon
Land Conservation and Development Act of 1973 . 8

'

The Act created

a new Department of Land Conservation and Development, 8 S in
which is located the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC). 8 6 The duties of the LCDC include: (1) establishing
state-wide planning goals and guidelines; (2) reviewing city, county,
and regional plans 8 for conformance with state-wide planning goals;
(3) coordinating the planning efforts of state agencies with local
comprehensive plans; (4) recommending the designation of areas of
critical state concern; and (5) issuing permits for activities of statewide significance. 8 8 The Act requires that zoning regulations implement local plans 8 9 and that local planning and zoning activities
conform to the state-wide planning goals and guidelines. 9 0 In 1977,
the LCDC was given the authority to enforce these requirements
through compliance orders. 9 1
80. Id. at 583, 507 P.2d at 28.
81. Id. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29.
82. Id. at 584, 507 P.2d at 28.
83. Id. at 582, 507 P.2d at 27.
84. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005 (1977). See MacPherson, Senate Bill 100: The Oregon
Land Conservation and Development Act, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 414 (1974).
85. OR. REV. STAT. §197.075 (1977).
86. Id. § §197.030, .075.
87. Id. § 197.140(2) (counties are made responsible for coordinating all land use planning activities within the county and are authorized to undertake joint planning efforts with
other counties).
88. Id. § 197.040.
89. Id. §197.175(2)(b).
90. E.g., id. § § 197.175(1), .175(2)(a), .251.
91. Id. § 197.320 (Supp. 1977).
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Even in the face of this new Act, the Oregon Court of Appeals
held that Fasano does not apply to the zoning activities of city
governments. 9 2 The Oregon Supreme Court, however, reversed,
holding that once a city has adopted a plan it cannot frustrate implementation of the plan by failing to zone accordingly. 9 Citing
Fasano, the court further held that the comprehensive plan is the
controlling land use planning instrument for a city; i.e., that zoning is
necessarily subservient to planning. 9 I
Although other state courts have been reluctant to accept
Oregon's view of planning and zoning, a number of them have followed in its distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial zoning
activities. 9 S There is, therefore, a trend toward closer judicial
scrutiny of local regulatory actions. The characterization of such
actions as quasi-judicial triggers the due process rights of affected
individuals to appear and be heard, and it necessitates preparation by
the local zoning tribunal of a record that includes reasons for zoning
decisions. 9 6 The purposes of these procedural requirements are to
protect substantive rights and, when a record has been prepared, the
judiciary has traditionally found itself in a good position to examine
the reasoning of earlier decision makers to determine whether substantive rights have been given appropriate respect. 9 7 In those states
that do not distinguish legislative from quasi-judicial zoning actions,
courts lack such an opportunity and planning policies generally remain unmentioned and unexamined. 98
92. Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Or. App. 89, 95-96, 520 P.2d 479, 483 (1974).
93. 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975). See also Peterson v. Mayor & Council, 279 Or.
249, 566 P.2d 1193 (1977); Bienz v. City of Dayton, 29 Or. App. 761, 566 P.2d 904
(1977).
94. Id. at 506, 533 P.2d at 776. This holding accepts the argument espoused by Professor
Haar in his 1955 article-that the master plan should be viewed as a sort of "impermanent
constitution." Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 353 (1955).
95. E.g., Snyder v. City of Lakewood,
-Colo.
-, 542 P.2d 371 (1975); McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470
S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516
P.2d 1234 (1973); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Fleming
v. Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). Cf Hyson v. Montgomery County, 242
Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966); Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md.
686, 376 A.2d 483 (Mdt. Ct. App. 1977); Kropfv. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139,
215 N.W.2d 179, 190 (1974) (Levin, J., concurring); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of
Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974). See Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrativeor Quasi-JudicialAct: The "New Look" in Michigan Zoning," 73
MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1975).
96. Id. at 1356-57.
97. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 46-51, 91 (1972). Cf VERKUIL,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INFORMAL RULEMAKING, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 205-10
(1974).
98. See, e.g., cases cited in note 67, supra.
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Several cases have achieved a similar result without recognizing
local regulatory actions as being quasi-judicial in nature. Instead,
they treat the absence of planning or the consistency of a decision
with stated planning policies as factors that affect judicial application
of the presumption of legislative validity. They may consider the
presumption "weakened" by the absence of a locally adopted
plan,9 9 or they may view, as the New York Court did in Golden, 1 0 0
a decision's consistency or inconsistency with a plan's policies as
unsupportive or supportive of a plaintiff's attempt to rebut the
presumption of validity.' 01 The two approaches (the weakened
presumption or recognition of the plan's relevance to a plaintiff's
rebuttal of the presumption) have a substantially identical effect and
give the plan a role that it has traditionally been denied.
State Legislative Actions
The reluctance of state courts to recognize the interrelationship of
planning and zoning has not discouraged the state legislatures from
doing so. Following years of discretionary zoning and planning (the
standard enabling acts permitted planning and zoning but did not
require them), many states have adopted statutes that mandate local
comprehensive planning' 02 and discard the "in accordance with a
99. E.g., Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 IU.App. 3d 230,
244-46, 309 N.E.2d 763, 772-73 (1974); Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 174
N.W.2d 789 (1970).
100. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 152 (1972).
101. E.g., Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 P.2d 670 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972)
(inconsistency); Green v. County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 340 A.2d 852 (DeL Ch.
1974), aff'd, 344 A.2d 386 (Del. 1975) (inconsistency); City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh,
495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973) (inconsistency); Montgomery County Council v. Leizman, 268
Md. 621, 303 A.2d 374 (1973) (consistency); Schilling v. City of Midland, 38 Mich. App.
568, 196 N.W.2d 846 (1972); Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Nev. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686
(1977) (consistency); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 888
(1968) (inconsistency); Board of Supervisors v. Alman, 215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975) (inconsistency).
102. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §29.33.070 (1977) (first and second class boroughs); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 11-802 (1977) (counties); CAL. GOV'T CODE § § 65100,65101 (West 1966
and Supp. 1977) (counties and cities); D.C. CODE §1-1004 (Supp. V 1978); DEL. CODE
tit. 9, §6807 (1975) (Sussex County); FLA. STAT. ANN. §163.3174 (Harrison 1978)
(local governments); IDAHO CODE §67-6503 (Supp. 1977) (cities and counties); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § § 1128, 1178 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (Northeastern Illinois Planning Comm'n & Southeastern Illinois Planning Comm'n); IND. CODE ANN. § § 18-7-2-4,
18-7-2-31 (Burns 1974) (counties containing first class cities); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ § 100.201, 100.137 (Baldwin 1971) (counties with population above 300,000); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § §473.858, 462.385, 462.39 (West Supp. 1977) (local governments within
the Twin Cities region and regions designated by governor pursuant to Regional Development Act of 1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § § 278.030, 278.150 (1977) (cities with population
above 15,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-1 09 (1978) (coastal counties); OR. REV. STAT.
§197.175(2) (1977) (cities and counties); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § l1-6-2 (Supp. 1978)
(municipalities); VA. CODE § § 15.1-427.1, -446.1 (Supp. 1978) (counties); WYO. STAT.
§9-19-301 (1977) (local governments and counties).
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comprehensive plan" language of the SZEA in favor of language that
more precisely prescribes the relationship between planning and

zoning.'

03

Alaska, for example, requires its boroughs to plan on an areawide

basis' 04 and, "in accordance with the comprehensive plan," to
regulate and restrict the use of land.' 0 The California Government
Code is more explicit. It requires each city and county to establish a
planning agency and to adopt a general plan,' 06 and that county or
city ordinances must be "consistent" with that plan.' 0 7 A zoning ordinance is consistent with the general plan only if: (i) the city or

council has officially adopted such a plan; and (ii) the various land
uses authorized by the ordinance are compatible with the objectives,
policies general land uses and programs specified in such a plan. 1 08

Florida also recently adopted a mandatory planning statute. The
Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975'09 requires
103. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §9-462.01 (1977) (municipalities: "[zoning] shall be
consistent with the adopted general and specific plans of the municipality . . ."); DEL.
CODE tit. 9, §6904(a) (1975) (Sussex County: "Regulations ...shall be in accordance
with the approved comprehensive development plan.. ."); D.C. CODE ANN. §5-414
(Supp. V 1978) ("[Zoning] shall not be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan for the
National Capital..."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3194(1) (Harrison 1978) ("All land development regulations . . . shall be consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan...");
HAW. REV. STAT. §225-21(c) (1976) ("All state agencies, and the respective counties,
shall comply with and implement the state plan. ..");IDAHO CODE §67-6511 (Supp.
1977) ("The zoning districts shall be in accordance with the adopted plan."); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§100.183, 100.213 (Baldwin 1971) ("[the adopted comprehensive plan]
shall serve as a guide for public and private actions. . ."; "Before any map amendment is
granted, [it must be found to be] in agreement with the community's comprehensive plan
[or (1) the original zoning must be found inappropriate, (2) major changes must be found to
have occurred] "); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30, §4962 (1978) ("[Zoning] shall be pursuant to
and consistent with a comprehensive plan adopted by [the] legislative body."); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.273 (West 1976) (Township rural zoning: "The provisions of the
zoning ordinance shall be based upon a plan . . ."); MINN. STAT. ANN. §473.865(2) (West
1977) (for language see note 58 supra); NEB. REV. STAT. §19-903 (1977) (first and
second class cities: "[Zoning] shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive development plan which shall consist of..."); NEV. REV. STAT. §278.250 (1977) ("zoning
regulations shall be adopted in accordance with the master plan for land use. . ."); OR.
REV. STAT. § 197.1 75(2)(b) (1977) ("each city and county in this state shall. .. [e] nact
zoning, subdivision and other ordinances or regulations to implement their comprehensive
plans"). See A.L.I. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-209 through 212 (1976).
104. ALASKA STAT. § 29.33.070 (1972).
105. ALASKA STAT. §29.33.090 (1972).
106. CAL. GOV'T CODE §65100 (1977) and §65101 (1966).
107. CAL. GOV'T CODE §65860 (Supp. 1977).
108. Id. In 1977, a California court interpreted these sections to mean that the general
plan is "a constitution for all future developments" and that they mean exactly what they
say: zoning ordinances must be amended within a reasonable time to conform with any
change in the plan. Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors, 71 Cal. App. 3d 655,
-, 139
Cal. Rptr. 741,748 (1977).
109. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3161 (Harrison 1978). The Act has not received any
funding for implementation. A two million dollar request was submitted in 1977. 5 Land
Use Planning Rep't 45 (1977).
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each municipality, county, special district, or local government
entity to prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan.' I0 If a lower
level governmental unit fails to adopt a plan, its development will be
governed by the comprehensive plan of the county in which it is
situated. If the county has no plan, the state land planning agency is
required to prepare one and submit it to the state's Administration
Commission, which has the authority to adopt it. After a plan has
been adopted, land development regulations cannot be approved
unless they are "based on, related to, and a means of implementation
for an adopted comprehensive plan"' '' and until they have been
subjected to review by the local planning agency.' 12
In addition to requiring local planning and zoning, a number of
states are requiring regional or state-wide zoning and planning activities.' 13 One of the first to take this step was Hawaii. The Hawaiian
Land Use Law of 19611' 14 established a State Land Use Commission
and gave it the responsibility to divide the state into four land use
categories: urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation. Counties are
responsible for land use controls within the urban districts, while the
Land Use Commission prescribes land use within the other districts.
The Colorado Land Use Act of 19741 ' ' gave local governments
the authority to designate certain areas and activities of state interest. These included mineral resource areas, natural hazard areas,
areas of historical, natural, or archaeological significance, and areas
around key facilities in which development may have a major effect
on the facility or on the surrounding community.' 1 6 Before designating the areas of state interest, local governments were required to
1
develop guidelines for the administration of the designated areas. 17
The content of these guidelines was required to further criteria of
state-wide interest as listed in the Act.'18 Finally, localities were
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. §163.3167 (Harrison 1978).
111. Id. §163.3201.
112. Id. §163.3194(2)(a).
113. E.g., Florida Environmental Land & Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT.
ANN. §380.012 (Harrison 1975 and Supp. 1977) (held unconstitutionally vague, City of
Key West v. Askew, 351 So.2d 1062 (Fla. App. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § §197.005 to
.430 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § §6001-91 (1973 and Cum. Supp. 1977); Maine Site
Location Law, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § §481-88 (Supp. 1973 and Supp. 1978); Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 40B, § § 20-23 (West
Supp. 1978); Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § § 800-819 (McKinney
Supp. 1977) (The Act has been challenged several times both judicially and legislatively in
the past two years) 5 Land Use Planning Rep't 118, 132 (1977). The Park's master plan was
upheld by the New York Court of Appeals in Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490,
362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1977).
114. HAW. REV. STAT. §205-1 to -37 (1976 and Supp. 1977).
115. COLO. REV. STAT. §24-65-101 to 24-65.1-502 (1974 and Cum. Supp. 1976).
116. Id. §24-65.1-201.
117. Id. §24-65.1-402(1).
118. Id. §§24-65.1-202,-204.
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authorized to adopt regulations interpreting and applying their
adopted guidelines to specific development projects.' 1 There is,
therefore, a built-in consistency requirement: regulations must be
based on guidelines which, in turn, must be formulated on the basis
of legislatively prescribed policies.
The California Coastal Act of 1976" 20 provides a third example
of state/local planning coordination. Each local government lying, in
whole or in part, within the coastal zone is required to prepare a
coastal "program" for its coastal zone lands.' 2 1 The coastal program
is submitted to the California Coastal Commission, 122 while the land
use plan portion of the program must be certified either by the
appropriate regional commission or by the Coastal Commission on
appeal from an adverse decision by the regional commissions. 23 A
land use plan is certified if it "meets the requirements of, and is in
conformity with, the policies [specified in the Act]."' 24 Regional

commissions also review zoning regulations and other implementing
actions, which may be rejected on the grounds that they do not
conform to, or are inadequate to carry out, the provisions of the
1
certified land use plan. 2 s
The Increased Importance of Planning in Perspective
The early reading of "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"
language of the SZEA was at least in part justified by the then
prevailing view of a zoning ordinance as a prescription for the future
development of land. Today, however, it is recognized that the zoning ordinance is only one of many growth management tools and
techniques that guide land development in a community at the same
time. Thus, a zoning ordinance can no longer be viewed as a plan in
and of itself; the "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"
language must be either replaced or redefined.
Although some courts have made preliminary steps in this direction, state legislatures have played the leading role. At least twenty
states have enacted legislation that mandates local planning and/or
119. Id. §24-65.1-402(2).
120. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30000-30900 (West 1977 and Supp. 1978).
121. Id. §30500.
122. Id. §30511.
123. Id. § 30512. Six regional commissions were established by the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §27000-27650 (West 1973), and
authorized to continue by the repealing 1976 Act. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §30300 (West
1977). See generally Peterson & Walker, Saving the Coast: The California Coastal Zone
ConservationAct of 1972, 4 Golden Gate L. Rev. 307 (1973-1974).
124. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30512(e) (West 1977).

125. Id. §30513(a).
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gives the plan a more important if not dominant role. Most state
courts have not yet had an opportunity to construe the newly
adopted provisions, but Oregon had its chance1 and took advantage of
it. Other states can be expected to follow suit. 26
CONCLUSION
Growth management, although not a new concept, is a changing
one. The changes have been of greater magnitude and in greater
number in the last decade than ever before. We have discussed just
two changes; but these two, we believe, are among the most important, and will be of increasing importance in the future.

126. The Idaho Supreme Court, in dicta, has noted that the state's Local Planning Act of
1975 made the adoption of a separate comprehensive plan a condition precedent to zoning
ordinance validity. Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257
(1977). A similar statement was made by concurring judges in Sabo v. Township of Monroe,
394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975) (Williams, J., concurring).
A state court recently construed the "consistency" requirement of California's land use
statute in a manner analogous to the Oregon decisions. Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors,
71 Cal. App. 3d 655, 139 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1977).

